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Abstract 
 
On September 19 2003, following weeks of concerted mobilisation, mobile phone  
subscribers in Nigeria took the unprecedented step of switching off their handsets en  
masse. The consumers took this symbolic step in protest against perceived exploitation  
by the existing GSM phone companies. Among other things, they were angered by  
allegedly exorbitant tariffs, poor reception, frequent and unfavourable changes in  
contract terms, and arbitrary reduction of credits. That action has continued to  
reverberate across the wider social pool in the country. At issue is a series of critical  
questions, which the protest helps bring into focus- how useful, or reliable is  
technology as an instrument of social activism? How is (mobile) technology shaping  
the democratic momentum in Nigeria, and indeed the rest of the African continent?  
And significantly, how useful is technology as a mechanism for the socio-economic  
empowerment of ordinary citizens? Using the boycott and the attendant fallouts as  
backdrop, this study provides a number of tentative answers. It argues that the boycott  
ought to be appraised, first, in the context of existing mistrust between customers and  
transnational big business in Nigeria; and second, against the background of difficult  
state-society intercourse which has mostly been characterised by the latter’s suspicion  
of the state’s connivance with the corporate establishment. Furthermore, we argue that  
because it gives civil society a combined cause and instrument of protest, mobile  
phones in the Nigerian context presage the emergence of a new social space of politics  
and agitation.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this paper is to illustrate civil society in action in with a view to 
examining the extent to which the picture that emerges either corroborates or departs 
from the dominant contentions in the existing literature on the subject1. While 
scholarship on civil society in African formations brims with conjectures and 
refutations, comparatively little has been done by way of empirical work to 
substantiate or rebut this rash of claims2. In this paper, I attempt partly to redress the 
situation by examining what might be called actually existing civil society, in this case 
the boycott of mobile telephone services on Friday September 19 2003 by subscribers 
in Nigeria. Although the boycott went largely unreported in the Western media, it 
remains, for many reasons, a watershed in the development of oppositional culture in 
the country.  
The first reason is the emergence in Nigeria of the use of modern technology as 
a tool for democratic activism and consolidation. The September 19 boycott 
consolidates the democratic opposition’s use of radio technology3 to generally 
mobilise against military rule and, specifically, protest the annulment of the June 12 
presidential election by the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-
1993).  
Second, ‘9/19’ (as it was called in the local press) arguably embodies a new 
imaginary of popular dissent, in particular the potential for the mobile telephone to 
open new vistas in ordinary citizens’ agitation for both economic and political self- 
determination in the country. What this means is that while the boycott at issue was 
specifically targeted at the mobile telephone companies, it was at the same time much 
more than that. In a sense, the boycott itself encapsulates the age-long feud between 
the citizens-as-customers and business corporations in Nigeria (witness for example 
the yet unresolved saga in the oil ‘producing’ Niger Delta), and between the same 
citizens-as-consumers and the Nigerian state. Indeed, the majority of consumers who 
took part in the protest saw it as a continuation of the larger project of righting the 
 
 
 
 
   Civil Society Working Paper No 23                                                                                                             Page no 5                                         
The GSM Boycott: Civil Society, Big Business and the State in Nigeria – Ebenezer Obadare 
wrongs that many believe are integral to the very idea of the Nigerian state. The 
following statement by the Chairman of the Unofficial Consumers’ Protection Agency 
(UCPA), Ojemaye Otitoka4 is an excellent illustration of this mentality:  
 
This is the spirit of this campaign. This is the real force 
behind its eventual success, the spirit of the Nigerian 
people who are speaking up for themselves finally. Now 
we are crying against exorbitant GSM tariffs. 
Tomorrow, using the same methods we will complain 
about other things.5 (Emphases added) 
 
 
Third, the public protest against the perceived corporate failings and excesses 
of the GSM phone companies signifies the emergence of a new outlet of voice6, and a 
new modality of engagement by civil society against the state. From the way ordinary 
subscribers enthused endlessly about the boycott, it was evident that they saw it as 
nothing less. Still, this is not to idealize the possibilities of (mobile) technology for 
democratic activism in Nigeria or generally.  
The paper begins with a brief exploration of the relevant theoretical literature 
on the possibilities of technology for democratic activism. This is followed by some 
background information on the context of telecommunications in the Nigeria, 
especially how it has been a contested site in the larger struggle between state and 
society. Thereafter, we outline the boycott itself, focusing on the immediate 
background, the issues at stake, and the aftermath. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of the implications of the boycott for the state in Nigeria, civil society, and the 
GSM companies. It also examines the consequences for conceptual understanding of 
the use of mobile technology for democratic activism.  
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2 Technology, the State and Democratic Activism: A Theoretical 
Sketch  
 
An in-depth theoretical analysis of how technology shapes society and vice versa is 
outside the purview of this paper7. By contrast, the aim in this section is to explore 
briefly the interface between technology (telecommunications technology in general 
and mobile technology in particular) and society. While a number of relevant studies 
have attempted to do this especially in the context of the West8, the analysis here 
specifically addresses the utility of (telecommunications) technology for political and 
social change within the specific context of the geo-political South, even though 
Nigeria is the main socio-geographic anchor for our analysis. 
Giving the preceding, we must begin by admitting the existence of what is 
frequently described in the literature as a “digital divide”- the gap in technological 
penetration of society between the global North and South, or more obviously between 
Western Europe and the United States, and the rest of the world. For Castells, the 
clearest marker of the difference that exists between the two digitally divided worlds is 
that while one part may be appropriately described as comprising “informational 
societies”, the other part may not.9 If this stratification is accepted- and it seems largely 
valid- then a clear majority of African countries easily fall under the latter rubric. 
This conclusion is supported by pertinent statistics. For instance, according to 
the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Technology Achievement 
Index (TAI) which “aims to capture how well a country is creating and diffusing 
technology and building a human skill base-reflecting capacity to participate in the 
technological innovations of the network age’” (UNDP 2001, 46)10, most African and 
other developing countries are still at a rudimentary stage when it comes to using 
technology as a basis for social development.11  
While many arguments may be advanced to rationalise this unflattering 
situation, the ugly truth is that the nature of the struggle for political and social 
resources across the continent has necessitated a situation in which successive African 
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leaders have regarded telecommunications technology with suspicion at best, and 
hostility at worst.  
Two quick examples from Nigeria will suffice. At the height of the opposition 
to the regime of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) in 1996, the regime’s National 
Security Adviser, Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, obviously worried by the speed at which 
knowledge of the Internet was spreading among the youthful segment of the Nigerian 
society, publicly contemplated banning the Internet or at least restricting popular 
access to it.12 Second, one of the issues that has paradoxically put the matter of public 
access to affordable and reliable telecommunications on the front burner was the same 
regime’s decision to make illegal the many telephone and related Information 
Technology (IT) centres which had mushroomed in different parts of the country. The 
General’s action was widely interpreted as an attempt to asphyxiate civil society by 
denying it the critical oxygen of information and communication.  
Technology, in particular telecommunications technology, is therefore central 
to state-society relations in Africa, and plays a crucial role in the perennial struggle for 
state power. It is therefore hardly coincidental that the introduction of mobile 
telephony in a country like Nigeria has come with the return to civil rule. The truth is 
that military regimes, with their pathological obsession with dominating the public  
space, will never voluntary cede control to contrary social forces, which is what 
technological liberalisation is believed to be tantamount to.   
In essence, and as amply illustrated by the foregoing, the state plays more than 
a marginal role in technology development in general, whether we are talking about its 
innovation, policy, or guidelines for its use. Castells has divided the impact of the state 
in relation to technology into two, what we might call, broadly, that of enhancement 
and stagnation.  According to him, while  
 
society does not determine technology, it can, mainly through the 
state, suffocate its development. Or alternatively, again mainly by 
state intervention, it can embark on an accelerated process of 
technological modernization able to change the fate of economies, 
military power, and social well being in a few years. Indeed, the 
ability or inability of societies to master technology, and 
particularly technologies that are strategically decisive in each 
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historical period, largely shapes their destiny, to the point where we 
could say that while technology per se does not determine historical 
evolution and social change, technology (or the lack of it) embodies 
the capacity of societies to transform themselves, as well as the uses 
to which societies, always in a conflictive process, decide to put 
their technological potential (2002, 7) (Italics added). 
 
 
A careful reading of Castells would suggest that the relationship between 
technology, the state and society is actually a dialectical one. While the state is wont to 
overdetermine the use of technology by society, society also uses technology to further 
its own ends, never mind that such may at times be fundamentally incompatible with 
the ‘reason of state’. The result, for instance, is the use of telecommunications 
technology for various kinds of political agenda, ranging from the progressive, social 
justice, ‘Seattle’ type, to the activities of terrorists with one grudge or the other against 
the modern liberal state.  
Mastery and adept use of telecommunications technology, needless to say, was 
crucial to the attack on United States targets on 11 September 2001. Indeed, if scholars 
like Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) are to be believed, a novel form of social 
organisation (after tribes, hierarchies and, markets) seems to have emerged around 
networks using sophisticated communication technologies and decentralized 
organisational structure. These ‘smart mobs’, to borrow Howard Rheingold’s (2003) 
apt characterisation are “self-regulated through flat governance hierarchies and 
distributed power.” (Ibid, 163).  
The ‘dialogue’ between technology and society seems therefore bound to result 
in unanticipated consequences. (Telecommunications) technology seems to be a 
neutral force that forces in society (civil or otherwise) can mobilise for different 
projects. Certainly, across contemporary Africa, telecommunications technology, most 
especially mobile technology, continues to establish a huge impact on the social 
landscape. To cite just two quick examples, mobile technology is believed to be 
helping Ugandan farmers deal with the vagaries of the market, while Congolese have 
apparently started talking to one another again after decades of bitter conflict, thanks to 
the introduction of mobile technology in the Congo Democratic Republic (BBC Focus 
Magazine January-March 2004). It remains a moot point whether the same technology 
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will not be used to telling effect by combatants if there is a recurrence of conflict in the 
foreseeable future.   
If the impact of technology on some aspects of social life is uncertain, the 
consequences for politics, especially democratic activism, are contested by scholars. 
Many remain outright sceptical about the democratic potential of new technologies, 
particularly media technologies. For Ake (2000), the public sphere brought into being 
by information technologies has hardly any boundaries, is too fluid, and too 
amorphous to elicit a sense of sharing in a social entity or to nurture political projects 
and democratic activism. Kroker and Weinstein (2000) agree, arguing that the new 
information superhighway “kills human agency and renders economic justice, 
democratic discourse, social solidarity and creativity obsolete” (quoted in Adebanwi 
2001).  
Other scholars seem more optimistic, insisting that “communities built inside 
machines or on air can be used to improve the ones outside of them” (Rheingold, 
2003). Pertierra (2002) argues for example that mobile phones, through texting, have 
provided people with “more freedom to express themselves in a strictly defined 
cultural environment” (2002, 8). For Finqualievich (2001), new media technologies 
undergird the emergent concept of electronic democracy, essentially “the increasing 
use of telecommunications technology to strengthen transparency, intra- and inter-
organisational communication and public participation in governance” (see Kuvaja and 
Mursu, op.cit. p. 18). According to him, electronic democracy transcends merely 
making information available on the net. Rather, it is about “changing management 
and organisation structures to enable citizens’ participation and access to information” 
(ibid).  
Recently, the optimists’ case has been buoyed by the role that new media 
technologies have played in global political transformations, especially in the 
developing world, a good example being the ‘coup de text’, which culminated in the 
ouster of President Joseph Estrada in the Philippines in January 2001. While scholars 
fail to agree on the specific impact that “thumb tribes” (see Rheingold 2003) invoking 
the “power of the text” had on EDSA II,13 there is no doubt that the more than 100 
million texts that Filipinos exchanged daily (Agar 2003, 109) were significant in the 
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process of mobilisation against the presidency of Erap14. Although there are those who 
point out that EDSA II was ultimately not about people power but in reality a 
reflection of the middle class’s influence and power of manipulation (see for example 
the brilliant discussion by Vicente Rafael (2003)), it is frequently cited as a crucial 
milestone in the use of technology for the purposes of social advocacy. More 
important, it has continued to inspire embattled groups elsewhere.  
In the run up to the 19 September 2003 boycott in Nigeria for example, it was 
common to hear aggrieved subscribers argue that “if it (switching off handsets to force 
the hands of phone companies) succeeded in Argentina and the Philippines, it will 
succeed in Nigeria.” Although it may be argued that the immediate object of the 
protest in Nigeria differed in form from that in the Philippines (while one was about 
using the boycott to force the GSM companies to, among other things, reduce tariffs 
and provide better services, the other concerned using the mobile phone as a tool for 
political overhauling), the ends are actually similar to the extent that one locates the 
protest in Nigeria within the right political context. As advanced earlier, the GSM 
boycott was not about the GSM companies alone but also about the totality of the rest 
of society in relation to the Nigerian state and economy. 
On the back of this observation, two related questions might be posed: What 
sort of public sphere do new media technologies give rise to, and how effective are 
they in contesting hegemony? While these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered 
here, a tentative statement can be safely made as thus: New technologies of 
communication, in particular mobile telephones, appear to expand the existing territory 
of public expression. This expansion is important for African countries and the 
developing world where decades of autocracy have led to the progressive shrivelling of 
the public sphere. They (i.e. new technologies) thus energise civil society by critically 
complementing the raft of issues around which it has usually organised. In this way, 
they generate a reason for as well as a means of social democratic activism.  
How does this happen? Schmidtke (1998) has advanced four related theses on 
the relationship of new technologies to collective action and political mobilization. 
According to him, new technologies reduce costs for collective action, reduce 
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individuals’ costs for engagement and participation, intensify the actors’ sense of 
engagement, and facilitate the formation of collective identity.  
While this may indeed be the case, how this plays out rests squarely on the 
immediate socio-political environment in which technology and society inter-course. 
As Schmidtke himself has warned, at the end of the day, it is not the medium, but the 
social and political context that determines the contours of subsequent events.  
The aim in the foregoing has been to locate the discussion in this paper in as 
broad a scholastic spectrum as possible in order to help in grasping the wider 
ramifications of what is at issue, which is how modern telecommunications 
technology, in this case mobile telephony, is interfacing with democratic politics and 
citizen action in Nigeria in significant ways. In what follows, I offer specific 
background information on telephony and the state in Nigeria. 
 
3 Regimes of Jealousy 
 
The telephone has been central to the projection of state power in Nigeria. Crucially, it 
has also been a strong element in social stratification as the possession of a telephone 
was supposed to be an index of where one belonged on the social ladder. According to 
one newspaper commentator, “in Nigeria, such amenities that have long been taken for 
granted as essential to modern living were preserved as status symbols. Public 
monopolies like NITEL (Nigerian Telecommunications Limited) were nursed at tax 
payers’ great expense in furtherance of the trend.”15 This was arguably the mentality 
behind the remark attributed to Colonel David Mark, minister of communications 
under the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, to the effect that telephones 
are not for the poor. Given this situation, the question may be rightly asked as to 
whether the failure of the Nigerian state to provide efficient telephony services is 
attributable to its familiar bureaucratic anaemia or, perhaps, a conscious policy to 
starve civil society of a vital source of energy. 
 Whether consciously or otherwise however, the reality is that prior to the 
introduction of GSM technology in the country in 2001, Nigeria was a virtual 
telecommunications desert. Relevant figures buttress this. Pre-GSM, Nigeria ranked 
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globally as the third lowest in teledensity (average number of telephones per thousand 
population) after Afghanistan and Mongolia (Oparah 2003). Although the first 
telephone call in the country was made in 1901, up till a century later in 2001, Nigeria, 
with a population of 88 million (according to the disputed 1991 national population 
census) could only boast of 450,000 lines. A majority of these lines were provided by 
the state-owned Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) and a handful of 
private telecommunications operators (PTOs). Nevertheless, services were invariably 
abysmal, and NITEL joined NEPA16 in the popular imagination as a spineless 
bureaucracy. 
In addition, the structure of ownership of the existing lines seems to lend 
credence to the point made earlier about the telephone as a social delineator. The 
450,000 odd lines were in the hands of less than 90,000 individuals and corporate 
organisations, many of which had more than 50 lines on their switch boards (Oparah, 
op.cit.). Furthermore, as telephones were intimately connected to social standing, new 
lines were almost impossible to acquire. The waiting time for a new telephone line was 
somewhere between 8 and 10 years, while the cost (minus installation charges) was 
about N80, 000 (about $800). This, at a time when the average annual salary was less 
than N40, 000 (about $400).   
 Instructively however, the issue of telecommunications, particularly of 
telephones, never disappeared from public discourse. Indeed, if anything, other 
developments in the larger society made its continuous debate imperative. One was the 
quantum leap in the number of citizens who were compelled by the prevailing 
economic situation to emigrate from the country. As this diaspora swelled, so did its 
needs, particularly those related to communication. This, among other factors 
connected to the impact of globalisation on the domestic economy served to put 
telecommunications issues on the front burner of public debate. As a result, successive 
governments felt compelled to pay lip service to the idea despite their apparent 
insincerity. For example, a core component of President Ibrahim Babangida’s 
otherwise garbled strategy of economic deregulation (Olukoshi 1993, Biersteker and 
Lewis 1996) was a national telecommunications policy. 
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  Indeed, the decree regulating the activities of the GSM companies was 
promulgated as far back as 199217. However, as pointed out before, the policy could 
not come to fruition partly due to the Manichaean worldview of its initiator. Nor did 
his immediate successor fare any better. When General Sani Abacha took over, he tried 
to hijack the benefits of the privatisation and commercialisation, particularly the 
mobile telephone services. “His own idea was to frustrate other prospective investors 
out of the market and use his own local and foreign fronts to place his outfit, 
TELECEL, in the controlling and dominant position” (Nnanna 2003). General Abacha 
was succeeded by General Abdulsalam Abubakar who also saw telecommunications as 
an extension of state power and awarded numerous telecommunications licences, 
ranging from direct tele-access to value added services (Otuya 2003).  
 Upon being sworn in on May 29 1999, one of the first things the current 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo, did was to suspend all telecommunications licences 
issued by the previous regime, especially those meant for mobile access.  He then set 
up a panel under an industry chieftain, Christopher Kolade, to audit and reassess all the 
licenses, at the end of which nearly all of them were cancelled.  
 
4 The Coming of GSM Telephony 
 
Having wiped the board virtually clean, the president decided to make public the 
process of issuing of licences to operators. This was in line with the radical glasnost 
that the newly elected regime was trying to promote. At the same time, the new 
dispensation was clearly trying to get the best from a telecommunications market that 
had witnessed many profound changes over the previous decade and had in the process 
become quite competitive.  
Cellular telephony was born in the United States,18but credit for the 
simplification of its previously complicated technology is usually given to the Nordic 
countries from where it spread to the rest of Europe. While a comprehensive history of 
the mobile phone is outside our immediate attention, one critical point is worth setting 
out. This is the inevitable insertion of GSM into the specific politics of societies where 
the technology was either developed or refined. For instance, one reason why mobile 
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technology diffused with ease throughout continental Europe was because, in the 
words of Agar (2003),  
 
the European Commission, the civil service of the 
European project, had seen in GSM a political tool of 
immense value: telecommunications- and particularly 
GSM- would provide the infrastructure of a Europe 
ready to mount a convincing economic challenge to the 
US and Japan, and a pan-European telecoms network 
would encourage organisations to think European” (pp. 
60-61). 
  
The inauguration of the technology in December 1982 in Stockholm, Sweden by 
engineers and administrators from eleven European countries was therefore a 
profoundly political act. The acronym GSM initially stood for the countries involved 
(Groupe Special Mobile), but later became the Global Standard for Mobile 
Communications (Agar, op.cit. p. 56). By 1996, GSM phones could be found in 103 
diverse countries, from Australia to Russia, from South Africa to Azerbaijan (ibid). In 
the same year, 7 million people (10 per cent of the population) in the Philippines 
owned a mobile phone- almost twice the number with landlines.  
 Many factors were responsible for this sudden explosion in the number of 
mobile phone subscribers and the evolution of what we might call a mobile culture. 
The first was cost. As the knowledge of mobile technology grew and dispersed, so did 
the price of the average phone fall (Ashurst 2004). Besides, as the prices fell, the 
“continuous miniaturisation of components” (Agar, p. 8) which had been a feature of 
electrical technology also ensured that the phones were increasingly lighter and more 
portable with time. By the year 2002, global subscriptions to cellular phones were 
reported to have exceeded the one billion mark (Agar, p. 5).  
Apart from declining cost (and user-friendliness), other factors made the 
mobile phone a hit with the consuming public. One of these is symbolic, having to do 
with the way in which the mobile phone is rooted in the affirmations and processes of 
the modern self19. Perhaps it is more than a coincidence that the mobile phone has 
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become popular in age which has become obsessed with individuality and assertion of 
personal freedoms. There is something essentially liberating20 about owning a mobile 
phone. For the owner, the mobile phone performs a myriad of ‘miracles’, central 
among which are the ability to be multi-locational or trans-locational. As the network 
connecting communities in the global village become denser, so also does the need for 
communication increase. One important dimension of this communicative necessity is 
the capacity to send messages in ‘text’ form21. Indeed, one might argue that this is the 
main reason behind the global popularity of mobile phones.  
What makes the ‘text’ so important and popular? For one, it seems mutually 
economically beneficial to both mobile phone subscribers and operators. As Rafael 
(2003) has noted, “unlike voice messages, text messages take up less bandwidth and 
require far less time to convert into digitized packets available for transmission. It thus 
makes economic sense for service providers to encourage the use of text messaging in 
order to reserve greater bandwidth space for more expensive-and profitable- voice 
message” (p. 404). Second, texting provides subscribers “with a way out of their 
surroundings. Thanks to the cell phone, they need not be present to others around 
them.” (Rafael, Pp. 405-6).  
Which is not to say that texting does not have its own social drawbacks. Much 
has been said for example about its perceived tendency to “disrupt protocols of 
recognition and accountability” (ibid, p. 408). The point however is that it is in fact 
due to these and other personal and social possibilities (both negative and positive) 
that the mobile phone/texting has acquired its existing global popularity. Arguably the 
potential to bypass, negate, subvert, undermine, antagonise, or even complement the 
state, as the case may be, is encoded into the very ontology of the mobile phone. 
This was the global state of affairs when Nigeria began the journey to license 
GSM operators in 2001. True to its earlier promise, the federal government threw open 
the auctioning process for four mobile licences in January 2001. At the end of the day, 
each licence was auctioned for a whopping $285m22, and by August 2001, three of the 
GSM operators had begun operations. These were the Zimbabwean-owned Econet 
 
 
 
 
Civil Society Working Paper No 23        Page no 16                                         
The GSM Boycott: Civil Society, Big Business and the State in Nigeria – Ebenezer Obadare 
Wireless Nigeria Limited23, the South-African-owned MTN Limited, and the state-
owned NITEL. So popular did mobile technology become that within a few months, 
the companies had exceeded their highest expectations. Initially, they had been 
sceptical about investing in the Nigerian economy because of its perceived volatility 
and the country’s history of political instability. At the same time, they were unsure 
about the purchasing power of potential customers. 
These fears were to give way to boundless optimism after a few months. For 
example, by September 30 2003, MTN could boast in excess of 1.3 million subscribers 
while its rival Econet had more than 850,000. Within the same period, both companies 
combined had spread their coverage to more than 1,500 villages and communities and 
over 100 cities (Aragba-Akpore 2003, Otuya 2003). In total, both MTN and Econet 
have a total of more than 3 million lines out of which 2.8 million is fully subscribed 
(Eke 2003). Overall, within 24 months, with new investments put at $3.8 billion 
(about N600 billion) and a teledensity of 2.6 telephone lines to 100 inhabitants, 
Nigeria’s telecommunications sector was rated by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) as the fastest growing in Africa (ibid).24  
The unexpectedly high number of users naturally translated into profits for the 
companies. In its first year of operation, MTN declared a pre-tax profit of N11 billion 
(Daily Times 11 August 2003, p. 10). Naturally too, with these profits came certain 
expectations, especially regarding the quality of services rendered by the GSM 
companies. Many consumers believed that the companies were simply not doing 
enough, preferring to cash in on an unsuspecting public to the detriment of good service. 
The companies disagreed, insisting that they were doing enough within the specific 
limitations of the Nigerian environment. These contrasting arguments are examined in 
the following section. 
 
Subscribers versus GSM Companies: Between Service and Profit 
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Laye Obasanjo, eni to o kawe nlo phone (In the Obasanjo 
era, even the unlettered use phones) (The Guardian 
February 29 2004).   
 
“It is true that what works elsewhere doesn’t necessarily 
work in Nigeria. Elsewhere in the world, GSM services are 
not burdened by the kind of poor quality that afflicts 
Nigerian subscribers. Elsewhere in the world, GSM calls are 
made with one dial whether GSM to GSM; GSM to 
landline; or landline to GSM. The question of network 
overload nonsense does not arise” (Kingsley Osadolor 2003, 
The Guardian 23 September 2003).  
 
 
These two statements capture the range of emotions provoked by the introduction of 
GSM telephony in Nigeria. While the first speaks to the popular elation, the second 
reflects public disappointment with the quality of services provided by the mobile 
telephone companies. There was a clear division between those who specifically blame 
the phone companies, and those who think that it was the vaguely defined, yet 
ubiquitous, ‘Nigerian factor’ that was making its mark felt yet again. 
  The disenchantment in question must be seen against the background of 
common expectations following Nigeria’s return to civil rule after sixteen years of 
military rule. Among many anticipated ‘dividends’ of democracy, the coming of 
mobile telephony was expected to signal a radical improvement in the common lot. At 
the very least, mobile telecommunication was expected to accomplish some of the 
‘miracles’ associated with its introduction in other parts of the world, for instance, 
‘abolishing’ distance by facilitating the conduct of business and interpersonal relations. 
Behind this, arguably, was the ‘telecommunicative fantasy’ (Rafael 2003) of using the 
mobile telephone as a means of asserting a new collective identity, remodelling the 
terms of engagement with the state, and, above all, seeking and achieving social parity 
with the ruling class which had jealously monopolised communications technology for 
so long.  
As such, it was apparently the felt inability of mobile technology to accomplish 
these tasks, or at least to begin to address them on an immediate basis, that fuelled the 
social anger which culminated in the boycott of 19 September 2003. Allied to this was 
the perceived failure of the state or the state-established National Communications 
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Commission to call the telephone companies to order and impose sanctions as and 
when necessary. Apparently, it was even felt in some cases that the companies 
operated in cahoots with the federal authorities, a factor which made them largely 
impervious to the agitation of the larger public. Indeed, many people were eager to 
draw parallels between the activities of the phone companies and those of oil 
companies in the oil ‘producing’ areas which were similarly notorious for conniving 
with the state to undermine the interests of the Nigerian public (Frynas 1998).  
 The subscribers’ case can be categorised in terms of complaints and demands. 
The basic complaints centred on the following: arbitrary reduction of credits, 
uncompleted calls, poor signals (otherwise known as “no network coverage” or 
“network busy”), service breakage, constant changes in contract terms, “usurious” 
tariffs (believed to be among the highest, if not the highest, in the world), misleading 
advertisements on new services, oversubscribed networks, problem of 
interconnectivity among networks, unsolicited diversion of calls, text message failures, 
artificial scarcity of recharge cards, and surcharging of undelivered text messages.  
To ameliorate this situation, the subscribers advocated the reduction of call 
tariff to N20 (as opposed to N50) per call per minute across board, reduction of SIM 
pack to N5,000 across aboard, immediate implementation of the per second-billing 
system (as opposed to per minute-billing) by all operators, free SMS service by all 
operators, free calls during weekends and off-peak periods, zero payment for all 
terminated and dropped calls, indefinite access (as opposed to limited but renewable 
access period) to the GSM network for all subscribers, immediate interconnection by 
all GSM operators, private telecommunication operators and NITEL, and cancellation 
of compulsory expiry dates for recharge cards. 
Initially, these complaints and proposals circulated among subscribers and the 
wider public through mere word-of-mouth, text messages, phone calls and letters and 
articles in the print media. Beyond this, the fist concrete initiative was the decision by 
Dr. Deolu Ogunbanjo and Prince Bayo Omotubora to instigate legal action against the 
two then operating companies, MTN and Econet. This was on March 8 2002, a date 
that, in retrospect, becomes symbolic for the formation of arguably the pioneer 
organisation to champion the cause of mobile phone subscribers in Nigeria- National 
Association of Telecommunications Subscribers (NATCOMS). In the words of Dr. 
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Ogunbanjo himself, “It started when we sued MTN and ECONET last year…it was 
after the first hearing that we knew how much suffering Nigerian GSM users were 
going through. When we got out of the court so many people just surrounded us. It was 
a large crowd and that was where NATCOMS was formed” (see The Guardian 12 
November 2003). 
 As the campaign against the GSM companies gathered steam, similar pro-
customer organisations sprang up, particularly in the run up to the September 19 
protest. Notably, nearly all of such organisations were formed for the specific aim of 
mobilising for the protest, as opposed to developing long-term strategies to combat the 
perceived excesses of the phone companies. As such, many of them have since fallen 
quiet after the protest, leaving the media as the only continuous vehicle of agitation. 
Examples of the many organisations which mushroomed and have since disappeared 
from the public view are: the GSM Subscribers Association of Nigeria, led by Ebun-
Olu Adegboruwa, Unofficial Consumer Protection Agency (UCPA), Nationwide 
Action Against Corruption (NAAC), Concerned GSM Subscribers in Nigeria, 
National Association of Mobile Phone Subscribers, led by a university Professor, 
Bunmi Ayoade, Probity in Nigeria (PIN), and Telecommunications Subscribers Rights 
Agenda (TSRA). 
 While NATCOMS took the legal route, these associations spearheaded a 
popular campaign to prosecute and defeat the phone companies in the court of public 
opinion. To complement the strategies listed earlier, they also distributed posters and 
leaflets and made a representation to the National Assembly where they could count 
on many sympathetic ears (see Osuagwu 2003).  
But it was the role of the media in the articulation of the demands that was to 
prove crucial in the process, thereby helping us to see the media itself in the context 
of the prevailing economic and social circumstances. The initial message of the 
protesters was circulated by text and it read, in part:  
 
From September 7-14 2003, switch off your GSM 
handsets between 10am-12 noon daily. Do you know 
that The GSM charge of N50 per minute is the highest in 
the world? In the US, a minute is N20, in Europe N23, 
in China N18, in South Africa N22 and in Ghana N23. 
Why N50 in Nigeria? This is a rip off! (Do not believe 
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their story that they pay more for diesel in Nigeria). 
Right now GSM operators in the UK are about to further 
reduce charges on airtimes.  
 
 
However, for some reason, this initial campaign led by Concerned GSM 
Subscribers was not popular with the majority of subscribers. Part of the explanation 
may have had to do with the fact that the organisers did not see the need to court the 
media and woo it to their cause. Not that this would have been difficult. A casual survey 
of the media would have discovered the widespread disaffection caused by a similarly 
profound disenchantment with the services of the GSM companies. This is evidenced by 
some of the headlines of stories focusing on their activities. The following sample of 
story headlines seems to reflect the overall mood of the media: “Two years of GSM 
pains and gains”, “GSM providers rip Nigerians of millions daily”, “GSM is ‘Go Spend 
Money’”, “GSM: Two years, too many troubles”, “The Great GSM rip off”, “Lies the 
networks tell”, The GSM Scam”, “Open Robbery”, “GSM Operations: A colossal rip-
off”, “Grand Swindling Machine”, “GSM dream turns sour”, GSM: Network Robbery 
or ‘Network Busy’?” 
 While therefore protesting subscribers limited themselves to letters to the editor 
and direct articles, the companies by contrast actively courted the media. One example 
of this determined courtship was the decision by the companies to give free handsets and 
lines to senior editors of media organisations25. This was complemented by the huge 
numbers of paid advertisements which they (the companies) caused to be published in 
different newspapers. These two factors made the phone companies extremely popular 
with the media.  
Perhaps this was why the planned boycott was not an instant hit with the media, 
and part of the reason why the media eventually decided to come on board might be 
traced to the tenacity of the subscribers and the pungency of the text message which 
caught the popular imagination. In this regard, contrary to the earlier call to action (see 
above) which demanded that subscribers switch off for two hours everyday between 7-
14 September, the latter text was simple and canvassed a one-day boycott. The message 
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read thus: “Let’s force GSM tariffs down. Join a mass protest switch off ur fone on fri 
sept 19 ’03. They’ll lose millions. It worked in US & Argentina. Spread Dis txt”.  
It is also not unlikely that many were attracted to the cause by the ‘knowledge’ 
that the method had already worked in other parts of the world, thus making its success 
in Nigeria feasible. Besides, evidence that the protest had struck the right chord could be 
seen in the decision of at least two newspapers, New Age and The Vanguard to feature a 
countdown to the boycott. While New Age encouraged its readers to follow the boycott 
and related events, and send their views comments to its website, Vanguard for its part 
created a column to collate arguments and views from the point of view of both the 
protesters and the service providers. For some reason however, this column disappeared 
a few days before the boycott, spawning rumours that the newspaper had been induced 
to take a dive. Media opinion notwithstanding however, many subscribers were clearly 
dissatisfied with the services of the GSM companies.  
If anything is clear from the discussion thus far, it is that the protesters did not 
have a monopoly of the public ear. The service providers, if we can call them that in the 
light of the quality delivery issues raised by the subscribers, also put their own case 
across as vigorously as possible. In a curious convergence with some of the claims made 
by the protesters, the companies also blamed factors integral to the Nigerian state and 
social environment for their alleged poor services. The easiest target was electricity, the 
erratic supply of which they blamed for their failure to guarantee reliable signals to their 
customers. The MTN claimed for instance that due to frequent power cuts, it used over a 
million litres of diesel a day to power generators at its installations across the country. 
The same situation apparently also applies to Econet for which the unreliability of power 
supply, according to Emeka  Oparah, its Head of Corporate Affairs, means, for example, 
that while a base station costs USD250,000 in South Africa, the same facility goes for 
USD375,000 in Nigeria because it has to be reconfigured to make it compatible with the 
erratic power supply in Nigeria (Oparah 2003). 
 As a result, the GSM companies argue, rather than castigate them for charging 
exorbitant tariffs for their products, subscribers ought to appreciate the unique 
constraints imposed by the Nigerian socio-political environment. Some of these 
constraints include the $285 million dollars paid for licences which the companies 
considered to be among the highest in the world, and the failure of the federal 
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government to channel the same money into developing necessary infrastructure as 
earlier promised26; the huge investments in hiring private security services to protect 
staff and equipment; and the huge sums paid out as ransom whenever to liberate 
kidnapped staff and/or protect installations from damage by social miscreants, known 
in the Nigerian parlance as ‘Area Boys’27.  
Other social constraints which, according to the companies, justified the 
allegedly high tariffs imposed for services are: the relatively low earnings of Nigerian 
consumers and the hugely unfavourable exchange rate of the Nigerian Naira28 to the 
dollar in a dollar-denominated market; the dependence of the companies on expatriate 
staff who are necessarily remunerated in hard currency; and the dearth of well-trained 
Nigerian personnel and the attendant huge corporate investment in the training of new 
recruits. Finally, the service providers also claim that there are other hidden cost 
elements in the provision of GSM services which seem to justify the allegedly high 
tariffs. These include interconnection costs, overheads, taxes and levies, interest 
charges and amortisation on leased facilities (Oparah, op.cit.).  
 The majority of subscribers did not seem to have been impressed by these 
arguments, many rightly pointing out that as the GSM companies knew well in 
advance of the vagaries of the Nigerian socio-economic environment, they cannot use 
the same environment as an excuse to either charge high tariffs or justify poor 
services. In any case, the subscribers were convinced that the companies might have 
decided to invest in the Nigerian telecommunications industry because of the same 
environmental limitations, given the scope it is known to provide for corporate 
profiteering. They argue that it is because the companies were in cahoots with the 
National Communications Commission (NCC), for example, that they persistently got 
away with their embarrassing services, and that they were only out to make profit out 
of poor customers.  
The GSM companies’ case was not helped by revelations in the media about 
the Central Bank of Nigeria’s concern that the companies’ cash flow is usually not 
allowed to stay for more than a few weeks in Nigerian banks before being converted to 
foreign exchange for one purchase or the other, thus reinforcing the worry that they 
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may only be contributing to the cost of turnover (COT) of the banks rather than the 
overall economy (see ThisDay August 6 2003). This was the evidence many needed to 
confirm their suspicion that the companies were more interested in profit than service 
to their customers. 
 
5 The Boycott and its Aftermath 
 
This was the situation in the period leading up to the September 19 boycott. That day 
has since gone down in the annals as a landmark in the history of public agitation and 
customer-corporation relations in Nigeria. According to the organisers of the protest, 
an estimated 75 per cent of mobile phone users switched off their phones in apparent 
compliance with the boycott call, a claim which, if true, would have led to the 
companies losing millions of Naira.  
The companies themselves admitted that a substantial number of customers 
actually switched off their phones, but insisted that these were fewer than the 75 per 
cent claimed by the protesters. What we do know of course is that a number of high 
profile individuals joined the protesters, thus giving their case definite publicity, if not 
a certain moral validation. Two examples are Gani Fawehinmi, lawyer and social 
justice crusader, and former external affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi. 
 To be sure, the public attitude towards the boycott was mixed. Although the 
print media generally recorded a simple victory for the protesters, it was also apparent 
that a significant number of people had decided not to obey the boycott for many 
reasons, including the possible loss of crucial business contacts and scepticism about 
the possibility of the boycott to achieve the intended ends.  
 But no one could doubt the dent that the boycott and the fractious debate 
leading to it had left on the corporate image of the GSM companies, and this, it seems, 
was more satisfying to the protesters. This perception was confirmed when, in the 
weeks following the boycott, the companies embarked on a charm offensive intended 
to win back the larger public and disaffected customers. For example, both MTN and 
Econet vigorously renewed their commitment to ‘corporate social responsibility’ by 
promoting a number of high profile social causes. Both, especially MTN, have become 
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visible in the sporting and educational arenas, and MTN’s Book Aid Programme is 
promoted in the media as its own contribution to Nigeria’s search for quality 
education29.  
For its part, Globacom, the indigenous-owned corporation which began 
operations in August 2003 has made a considerable impact in the promotion of soccer. 
It sponsors the premier division of the national soccer league which has since been 
renamed the NFA Globacom Premiership, and was a constant presence in the media in 
January 2004 when Nigeria settled for a bronze medal in the 24th edition of the African 
Cup of Nations football tournament. Many supporters who made it to Tunisia, the 
venue of the tournament, to cheer on the national soccer team, did so thanks to 
sponsorship from the company. 
 In addition to these, the protesters could also point to a few other concrete 
gains. The major one perhaps is the introduction of per second billing (PSB) as 
opposed to per minute billing (PMB) which subscribers complained about as it meant 
that they automatically had to pay for the whole of the next minute for calls that 
exceeded the previous minute even by a second. The excuse of the subscribers had 
been that it was impossible to offer customers per second billing until they attained 
“reasonable maturity” or at least three years after the commencement of operations. 
However, following the boycott and the introduction of Glomobile which gave its 
customers the per second billing option on August 29 2003, Econet and MTN had no 
choice but to follow suit. Yet, they did not do this without attempting to claw 
something back- subscribers who opted to be billed on the per second billing platform 
were made to pay a switch-over fee of NGN300 each (Oluseitan 2003).  
In addition, in an apparent attempt to recoup some of the money they 
conceivably lost in making the per second billing platform available to interested 
customers, both MTN and Econet started charging specified amounts for a range of 
services that were previously free. For example, access to the MTN customer service 
centre and the customer’s account balance (which used to be free) now attracted N6 
per minute or 6k per second. To further assuage disgruntled customers, MTN also 
offered 100 free texts many of which, ironically, did not reach their destinations as 
usual.  One other seemingly positive fallout of the boycott could be noticed in the 
increased determination of the Ernest Ndukwe-led National Communications 
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Commission (NCC) to ensure that the compliance of the service providers with the 
industry’s basic regulations. To this end, it introduced the idea of the establishment of 
a Consumer Arbitration Panel in each of the 36 states of the country to listen to the 
grievances of subscribers and arbitrate where possible in disagreements between them 
and the GSM companies. In addition, the NCC issued a firm deadline on 
interconnectivity30 to the companies, although as at the time of writing, the companies 
were yet to comply despite repeated calls and new deadlines31. The process leading to 
the boycott also called official attention to the plight of consumers, and it is on record 
that on at least two occasions, the senior officials of both MTN and Econet were 
invited to the federal capital in Abuja to defend themselves. They were also made to 
appear before the Senate Committee on Commerce and Communications for the same 
purpose. 
 
 
6 Conclusion: Mobile Technology, Civil Society and the State in 
Nigeria 
 
GSM phones are a great blessing in our lives…These new 
phones provide direct personal contact. We relate to them 
in a private manner. GSM phones have similarly reduced 
the distances in our lives. Reuben Abati, “How Did We 
Live Without GSM? The Guardian on Sunday, 11 January 
2004 
 
Religion was once known as the opium of the people…A 
new age has dawned with a new opium known as GSM. In 
this brave new world of capitalism and globalisation, 
GSM is the drug that lulled everybody into excited stupor. 
People are daily going broke in the name of making very 
expensive phone calls, but like all drug addicts kicking the 
habit is easier said than done. 
 
 
 There is no doubt that the introduction of mobile telephony has radically transformed 
the Nigerian social landscape. By the end of 2003, there were more than two million 
mobile phone subscribers in the country. This transformation is what the two 
commentators above speak eloquently of. 
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Evidently, it has also given civil society a new energy by providing a new 
cause around which to organise, and a new platform for challenging both statist and 
corporatist hegemonies. Furthermore, mobile telephony has come to manifest 
simultaneously as both the subject and instrument of agitation, lending a new  
dimension to the nature of the struggle for the public space in Nigeria. In this way, it 
ought to be noted that ‘9/19’ was symbolic both in the context of anti-corporatist 
politics in the country; and the use of technological means (the text message in 
particular) as a tool for attempting to right perceived wrongs in the domains of both 
politics and communications.  
 Against the background of our initial aim however, what appears to be even 
more important is the way in which the totality of the boycott, beginning from the 
process of mobilisation for it, through the strategies employed by the main 
protagonists (protesters and service providers), and down to its aftermath helps 
illuminate the dynamics of actually existing civil society. We have seen (among other 
things) ordinary citizens’ mobilisation (in this case against entrenched business 
interests) on the platform of civil society; the circumstances under which civil society 
‘erupts’ or emerges; and the points on the social canvas at which civil society and the 
state both connect and depart. At the same time, considerable light has been shed on 
the configuration, strengths, and inevitably, weaknesses of actually existing civil 
society. This seems to be a good way of testing the validity or otherwise of claims 
made in the theoretical literature in respect of civil society in social formations like 
Nigeria’s.  
 We now move on to some observations which follow logically from the 
foregoing and arise from the data presented in the preceding paragraphs. The first 
concerns the relationship between (mobile) technology and social democratic activism. 
It would seem from our analysis here that optimistic prognoses about the utility of 
mobile technology for social activism are partly justified. Through text messaging and 
concerted media mobilisation, the organisers of the ‘9/19’ boycott were able to call 
official and corporate attention to the challenges facing mobile telephone users. And 
while the protest did not necessarily bring down a government as was controversially 
the case in the Philippines, it at least led to a number of decisions which partly 
redressed the situation of subscribers.  
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 Nevertheless, as in the Philippines, it could also be argued that the boycott also 
showed up the very limitations of the use of technology for purposes of social 
activism. Rafael (2003) has noted in the case of EDSA II that the protesters neither 
challenged the nature of the state nor its class divisions, and that at the end of the day 
President Joseph Estrada was replaced by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, his Vice 
President and daughter of a previous president. In the case of the September 19 
boycott, it can also be said that at the end of the day, the GSM companies appeared to 
have had the last word by taking back with one hand what they had given away with 
the other. But does this suggest that mobile technology is largely ineffectual? Again, 
that may not be the case. Instructively, in the Philippines, one of the first steps taken 
by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was to ban “malicious, profane, and obscene texts” (see 
Agar 2003, 109), a move which more than anything demonstrates her recognition of 
the potential power of text messaging.  
 One possible conclusion could be that mobile telephony or technology alone, 
while no doubt important, may not be sufficient to accomplish specific democratic 
objectives. For one, it seems to be more effective when aligned with other instruments 
geared towards the same end. Second, and more important, its effectiveness is greatly 
determined by the prior strength and creativity of the social forces in whose hands it is 
a weapon. Technology (including mobile technology), it seems, does nothing on its 
own rather specific social conditions shape its use and effects. To cite Agar’s 
dialectical observation about the Filipino experience, “mobile phones are moulded by 
the countries they are used in and give form to the nation in return” (2003, 110). Thus, 
for Nigeria, while mobile telephony has no doubt come to be seen as a veritable 
instrument of political struggle, its potential effectiveness is bound to be determined 
by the way in which it is used. And while it is definitely a welcome addition to civil 
society’s arsenal, it may not necessarily fulfil the fondest ‘telecommunicative 
fantasies’ about securing total victory in the contest for social and economic justice. 
Another observation centres on civil society, especially how its character 
seems to change in relation to the issues around which it mobilises at a given historical 
moment. From the Nigerian case outlined above, it would seem as if social adversity 
and a perception of injustice (economic or political) are required to rouse civil society 
into action.  
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Following Nigeria’s return to civil rule in May 1999, the landscape that is civil 
society has been rapidly transformed due to the ‘desertion’ of many influential figures 
to the state sector, a process which, many believe, has led to the relative emptying out 
and weakening of civil society.32 As part of the same process, many Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which had sprung up earlier to mobilise against 
military rule have sought to reinvent themselves, with many leaving Lagos (the former 
capital and seat of democratic activism) for Abuja, federal capital since 1991, to seek 
new opportunities. The overall result of this process was to weaken civil society and 
expose it to the depredations of the state. 
This was the state of affairs as agitation for the boycott gathered and spread, 
and it comes as no surprise that many of the public voices that had fallen relatively 
silent in the previous three years or so saw an opportunity to weigh in on behalf of the 
public and make themselves heard again. In this sense, the boycott could be said to 
have presented civil society with both a new platform for mobilising as well as a 
welcome opportunity to re-charge itself.  
Yet, given what we have observed earlier about the limitations of technology, 
and mobile telephony in particular, it is obvious that civil society cannot rely 
absolutely on it in order to reinvent itself. Indeed, many associations sprang up in the 
heat of the day to champion the cause of the protesters, but as we have noted earlier, 
the majority of them have since become strangely inaudible, highlighting the critical 
need for organisational continuity on the part of civil society actors. In this way, it is 
reassuring to observe that, after the boycott, some of the organisations continued to 
pursue the judicial option. For example, on November 23 2003, an Abuja Federal High 
Court granted a group, Nationwide, permission to sue the GSM companies for failure 
to connect their networks (Okenwa 2003).  
My final point concerns the relationship between civil society and the state. 
The state was a recurring decimal in the process which we have outlined in this paper. 
It came under attack from civil society organisations and citizens who thought that it 
had failed to take firm action against the erring telephone companies. Some went to the 
extent of accusing it of acting in cahoots with the service providers. The latter, for their 
part, blamed it for not providing adequate infrastructure (like regular electricity and 
security) that might have made life less difficult for them and easier to satisfy their 
Civil Society Working Paper No 23        Page no 29                                         
The GSM Boycott: Civil Society, Big Business and the State in Nigeria – Ebenezer Obadare 
customers. They also blamed it for not channelling the huge sums paid for licences 
into the development of required infrastructure for the communications industry.  
Leaving the merits or demerits of these allegations aside, what definitely 
emerges is that to be effective, civil society requires a state that is efficient, 
transparent, firm, and able to enforce compliance with its wishes without degenerating 
into tyranny. Notably, the GSM companies failed to link up their trunks despite 
repeated calls from the federal authorities to do so. While it is not unknown for 
business concerns to try to maximise profit, experience shows that it usually takes the 
firmness and determination of the state to rein them in. Lastly, it is also apparent that 
no matter how determined, civil society, ranged against the immense powers that huge 
business concerns are capable of mustering, cannot create the desired changes in 
society alone. It requires a strong state that is resolutely committed to the rule of law 
and social transparency. 
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Notes 
 
1 The recent global upsurge of interest in civil society has inevitably produced a chaos 
of understandings. For a brilliant summary of a confusing (and often confused) debate, 
see the “Introduction” by John and Jean Comaroff to their edited volume (1999). In 
this paper, civil society will be understood as the free association of ordinary citizens 
in pursuit of the common good. The conceptual lineage to which this understanding is 
closest is what might be called the Dahrendorf School which envisions civil society as 
‘the anchorage of liberty’. See Dahrendorf (1990). 
 
2  Such claims range from the outright denial of the possibility of civil society in 
African and other non-Western societies (Gellner 1994), to other controversial 
assertions about the character of civil society in Africa, and the nature of its 
relationship with the state. For a summary of this debate see Obadare (2004).  
 
3 For more on this see Adebanwi 2001  
 
4 Most probably a pseudonym for Dr. Deolu Ogunbanjo 
 
5 See The Guardian, Lagos, 19 September 2003  
 
6 Here, we draw theoretical inspiration from Albert Hirschman’s landmark study of 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) 
 
7 For more on this see for example Borgmann (1987), Heidegger (1977) and Cooper 
(2002).  
 
8 See for example Bauman 2000, and Gaonkar and Povinelli’s incisive introduction to 
Public Culture’s ‘Accidental Issue’ on ‘Technologies of Public Persuasion’ Volume 
15, Number 3, Fall 2003 
 
9 “Informational societies”, he argues, are those “in which information generation, 
processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and 
power because of new technological conditions emerging in this historical period”. 
“Informational societies”, of course, are different from mere “information societies” in 
which “information, in its broadest sense, e.g. as communication of knowledge, (is) 
critical” (parenthesis added). See Castells (2002, 21) 
 
10 Quoted in Kuvaja and Mursu (2003)  
 
11 Many African/ist commentators also concur with this conclusion. See for example 
Yau 2003, Williams 2004, Cogburn and Adeya 1999, and De Alcantara 2001  
 
12 This is not unheard of as the government of China, for instance, continues to impose 
varying degrees of restriction on its people. 
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13 After EDSA I, the popular insurrection against Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The full 
meaning of EDSA is Epifanio de los Santos Avenue 
 
14 ‘Erap’ was Joseph Estrada’s text-compliant nickname. It means ‘buddy’ backwards 
in Tagalog, the Philippines’ main language.  
 
15 See Ochereome Nnanna, op.cit. 
 
16 National Electric Power Authority. For more on NEPA see Olukoju (2004). 
 
17 See The Guardian, Lagos, 12 November 2003 
 
18 For a global history of the mobile phone see Agar (2003). 
 
19 For more on this see Myerson 2001. 
 
20 This is an argument that can be stood on its head as it can also be argued that in a 
sense, the mobile phone possesses the capacity to ‘imprison’ or fixate.  
 
21 The first text message was sent accidentally in 1993 by Riku Pihkonen, a Nokia 
engineering student. At that time, it was not thought to be important. See Agar, op.cit., 
p. 169. 
 
22 The high cost of the licences was to become an issue in the run up to the 19 
September 2003 boycott. The GSM companies claimed that the cost was one of the 
highest in the world, seemingly justifying the exorbitant tariffs which the protesters 
also claimed were among the highest in the world. 
 
23 As at the time of writing, it was embroiled in a long-drawn takeover bid by South-
African based Vodacom, a subsidiary of Vodafone UK.  
 
24 The sudden explosion of GSM in Nigeria was, admittedly, part of a continent-wide 
momentum. 95.61 per cent of African users use GSM. In the past 12 months, there has 
been a 101.85 per cent growth of GSM users in Africa, as opposed to a growth rate of 
52.49 per cent globally. Vodacom, the biggest African network is Vodacom has over 
7.5 million subscribers, while the total number of African subscribers (all 
technologies) is 34.3 million. The biggest market is in South Africa with 14.4 million 
users. This is expected to grow to 19 million by 2006 (Ashurst 2004, 20).   
 
25 Personal communication with a newspaper editor, Lagos, July 2003. 
 
26 It is on record that this money was paid into the federation account from where it 
was eventually shared among the three tiers of government-federal, state and local.  
 
27 For more on the phenomenon of ‘Area Boys’ see Herault and Adesanmi (1997). 
 
28 As of summer 2005, N255 (Nigerian Naira) exchanged for £1.00 (GBP). 
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29 See for example The Punch, Lagos, June 12 2003. 
 
30 This was one of the issues behind the boycott. The service providers could not agree 
on the modalities for opening their trunks to one another, making it impossible at best 
and nightmarish at worst for users to make calls between networks. One result is the 
quite ridiculous sight of consumers with three different handsets for the three different 
networks.  
 
31 The first deadline expired on November 20 2003.  
 
32 Personal Interview, Tope Toogun, Lagos Nigeria, March 2003. 
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